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a cold, impersonal, corporate world. That may not be the last word
on modem libel law, but it is a good beginning.

POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE SUPREME
COURT: ESSAYS ON THE FRONTIER OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY. By ArthurS. Miller.1 Westport, Ct.:
Greenwood Press. 1985. Pp. viii, 368. $35.00.
GOD, COUNTRY AND THE SUPREME COURT. By
James K. Fitzpatrick. Chicago, 11.: Regnery Books. 1985.
Pp. X, 217. $18.95.
Scott G. Knudson 2

Professor Arthur Miller's most recent book is a collection of
essays, all but one of which were first published in various legal
periodicals from 1974 to 1984. Some of the topics are fairly narrow.
Several, however, raise the most sweeping jurisprudential issues. In
an introductory essay, Professor Miller suggests that constitutional
jurisprudence is dominated by several myths-for example, the
myth of separation of powers. More broadly, Miller argues that
scholars should recognize that the Supreme Court is one of the
political branches of the government, to be analyzed as such.
In his central essay in the second chapter, Miller lays out his
thesis that constitutional study should not focus simply on the Constitution of 1787, but on three "constitutions"-political, economic,
and corporate-which determine how America is organized and directed. Miller carries this theme throughout the book, arguing in
the third essay that we are moving from a constitution of powers to
a constitution of control, under which modem technology will increase the concentration of state power, resulting in an increased
emphasis on state security and mass control measures.
Miller asserts that orthodox constitutional thought is permeated by a basic myth: that ours is a government of limited powers,
as set forth in the Constitution. Borrowing a concept from Professor Michael Reisman, Professor Miller calls this myth the jurisprudential publique, the orthodox constitutional law of lawyers, judges
and most scholars. The reality, he says, is ajurisprudence confidentie/le, the private and largely unwritten set of rules that govern the
I.
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behavior of governmental officers. No constitutional theory can be
accurate unless it incorporates these informal rules.
Miller says that eighteen principles make up the political constitution; one of these principles, for example, is that the political
constitution is evolutionary, changing in interpretation and application as circumstances change.
The principles of the economic constitution are strongly procapitalist, with the state delegating the power to govern to property
owners, who have biased the law in favor of their class. Miller's
anti-corporate attitude is evident, as he asserts that the corporation
is part of the growing social stratification that has subordinated the
individual while increasing the power of a governmental and corporate bureaucracy that dominates society. For instance, he thinks
that universities have become mere service stations for corporate
America.
The third essay focuses on Miller's concern with the increasing
power of the state to use modem technology to concentrate power
to control masses of society. Although America has been governed
by a constitution of powers, Miller asserts that a combination of
crises (like commodity shortages, ecological dangers, and the threat
of nuclear war) is moving us toward a constitution of control. Once
a country of bountiful resources, America is facing a shortage of
affordably priced resources that will curtail our standard of living.
Further, Miller argues that the technological advances that brought
this country to its high standard of living will also enable the state
to centralize power and to control the populace. As examples, he
mentions the advance in microprocessing, which can destroy privacy, and the National Security Agency, which has a far-reaching
ability to monitor overseas communications.
Professor Miller's other essays deal with narrower topics, such
as Wisconsin's open primary law (struck down by the Supreme
Court), the status of corporations under the fourteenth amendment,
and emergency powers, most of which relate in some way to his
prediction that we are headed for a super-government that eventually will control all of American society.
His conclusion, that scarcity will force America to move from
a "constitution of powers" to a "constitution of control" (read police state), strikes me as too facile. Similar apocalyptic predictions
have been made before; they are notoriously unreliable. Human ingenuity and self-interest have responded to past needs; there is no
reason to expect that solutions for new problems cannot again be
found. Not long ago, neo-Malthusians predicted that reserves of oil
were likely to be consumed within a decade. Since then, there have
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been changes in energy consumption, partly because of regulations,
but also because of market forces that have led to a surprising drop
in oil prices.
Miller fails to recognize that modern technology can be a democratizing force. The personal computer, for instance, decentralizes the analytical tools needed to be effective in modern society,
enabling a clever but small entrepreneur to compete against a large
corporation. Nothing in our history indicates that the necessary
adjustments cannot be accomplished through market-induced technological change and supply and consumption adjustments. Compulsory adjustment measures, even if necessary because of some
short-term event (a new Arab oil embargo, for example), do not
presage the coming of a police state.
Miller's very negative views of the future are evident in his argument that the mass media will be a tool to produce this new state.
He does not explain how the press will become subservient to the
state. Why will the media manipulate public opinion to serve the
ruling elite's view of the national interest? Individual newspapers
or networks may be manipulated from time to time, but isolated
instances do not mean that the press is prone to extensive and prolonged manipulation. To effect that level of control, a strong and
enduring consensus would have to exist between the ruling elite and
the editors and publishers and news directors. In my view, this uniformity of views is nowhere evident. The press, let us recall, helped
to destroy McGovern and Hart as well as Nixon, Johnson as well as
Goldwater. The publishers tended to dislike Franklin Roosevelt,
yet his power was partly due to skillful use of the media. Much the
same can be said of President Reagan. The Defense Department
knows the art of propaganda; but "peace activists" and disarmament receive extensive and largely favorable publicity. Unfortunately, such complexities and nuances are missing from Professor
Miller's world-view.
One might suppose that Miller would welcome any decision of
the Court that expanded the potential for vigorous political debate
as a means to forestall the development of a constitution of control.
In fact, however, he is critical of the Court's protection of the political rights of corporations, on the ground that their wealth gives
them undue political power. Here again the problem is more complex than Professor Miller acknowledges. Beyond doubt, corporate
wealth creates enormous political clout. Viewed in isolation, this
advantage is unfair. But part of their clout is used against each
other. Besides, those who wish to regulate corporations also have
unfair advantages-for instance, the false public perception that a
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corporation is simply a rich, impersonal entity, rather than a representative of the ordinary people who own its stock, or consume its
products, and who may be hurt by a regulation that reduces corporate profits or increases the prices of corporate products.
II

Although James Fitzpatrick also advocates major changes in
constitutional law, his blueprint differs markedly from Miller's. In
Fitzpatrick's view, America was founded on Christian religious
principles, which were both expressly and implicitly embodied in
the Constitution. He maintains that we have lost touch with these
principles, moving increasingly toward a secular society lacking a
core sense of values. To counter this trend, Fitzpatrick argues that
religious values should be reincorporated into the ethos that shapes
our primary social institutions-the family, schools, and communities-to give people a sense of what is good about society and worthy of a responsible loyalty. He develops this idea through a series
of essays on apparently disparate topics, from John Calhoun to the
Scopes trial to McCarthyism. In a final essay on abortion, he attempts to tie all these subjects together, arguing that society has a
right to embody its moral principles in its laws.
Fitzpatrick introduces his essays with a quote from Edmund
Burke: "It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things that men
of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters." The founding of this country was an attempt to prove that
the historic checks on those "passions," a monarchy or state
church, were unnecessary. The "great experiment," says Fitzpatrick, is nearly over. We have moved from a religiously based society with a republican system of government to a secular society
lacking the checks upon will and appetite that insure social survival.
Fitzpatrick amplifies on this theme in his essay on the establishment clause. Beginning with the Pilgrims and the Mayflower
Compact, he reviews some of our founding documents in an effort
to demonstrate that colonial Americans wanted to maintain a role
for religion in government. True, the adoption of the establishment
clause meant that the framers rejected a theocratic society in favor
of a national government without an established church. But they
did not mean that it was unconstitutional for public policy to reflect
religious convictions. The primary purpose of the establishment
clause was to prevent sectarian strife, to prevent the national government from interfering with churches within individual states. In
support of this view, Fitzpatrick cites the founding charter of
Brown University, drafted in 1765. That charter stated that a mem-
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ber of any protestant denomination could serve as a professor or
tutor at the university, that the university was open to students of
all religious denominations, and that "the sectarian differences of
opinion shall not make any part of the public and classical instruction." Fitzpatrick asserts that the quoted sentence is nearly identical to the intention of the draftsmen of the establishment clause.
Fitzpatrick also attacks the broad scope of judicial review that
has been adopted by the Supreme Court. His argument is not that
Marbury was wrong, but that the Court has gone far beyond the
position taken by Marshall in Marbury. The mistake, in his view,
was to go from Marshall's position that acts of Congress which demonstrably violate the Constitution are to be declared invalid, to
Chief Justice Hughes's position that the "Constitution is what the
Supreme Court says it is." Nevertheless, Fitzpatrick cautions
against overemphasizing judicial imperialism. He points out that in
another generation it may be the liberals who will argue that the
Court's power should be restricted. The fundamental issue, he says,
is what society should stand for, not what governmental techniques
it should employ.
For Fitzpatrick the issue in the Scopes trial was whether "empiricism and secular humanism set loose in Europe in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment will win the final victory over the
older Biblical understanding of the nature of man and his role in
history, the role associated with the Christian faith." He stresses
that public schools, at least below the college level, are social institutions paid for by the people to transmit the skills and values of the
community. Community control of the schools will help to achieve
this, but it also requires something more: a concern for the content
of what schools teach.
Writing on Joseph R. McCarthy, Fitzpatrick notes that the
late Senator is commonly reviled as more evil than a long line of
criminals, like Leopold and Loeb and Charles Manson. So accepted
is this view that even the average dictionary now has a pejorative
definition of McCarthyism. Fitzpatrick argues that this negative
characterization is a vast oversimplification of the events that surrounded McCarthy. Basically his thesis is that although McCarthy's methods were unfortunate, McCarthy had influence because
the American elite could not face up to the fact that communism
was a true threat to the country.
Fitzpatrick reserves his most emotional essay for his analysis of
the Supreme Court's abortion decisions. Reflecting on the evolution of American attitudes, from opposing abortion to supporting a
woman's right to abortion, Fitzpatrick likens the change to the will-
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ingness ofthe Germans to accept the Nazi regime in the 1930's. By
denying the separate existence of the fetus, America is taking one
more step down the road to euthanasia. Once one analyzes the
question of human existence merely as one of viability, Fitzpatrick
argues, there is no logical defense against infanticide, since no infant
is viable without outside support.
While Fitzpatrick's goal of revitalizing traditional values is
laudable, he overlooks a critical paradox: if support for those values has diminished greatly in modem America, as seems to be the
case, then they can no longer be enforced democratically. Committed to democracy as he is, Fitzpatrick never faces up to the possibility that his religious and cultural preferences may no longer be
compatible with democracy. For example, even if one assumes that
(1) abortion is wrong and (2) Roe will be overruled, it is unrealistic
to expect that most states will tum the clock back and prohibit all
or nearly all abortions.
The consensus of religious belief that may have existed in 1787
does not mean that the same convictions are equally prevalent today. Moreover, Fitzpatrick has no answer for the question how to
resolve conflicts between different groups with equally firmly held
convictions concerning religion or morality. In one community
Catcher In The Rye may be deemed unfit for school children, while
in another Huckleberry Finn and Little Women may be condemned
as preserving racial and sexual stereotypes. Conservatives are not
the only ones who want to enforce "fundamental values."
Despite their considerable flaws, neither of these books should
be ignored. Fitzpatrick helps us to understand the attitudes of the
religiously-motivated activists who are now so prominent on the
political right. Miller's book is a valuable reminder that even in
America the legal Constitution is not the most fundamental social
fact, that in an important sense we have "constitutions" rather than
"a Constitution."

